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Abstract
It is generally accepted that good corporate governance, executive
compensation and the threat of litigation are all important mechanisms
for incentivizing managers of public corporations. While there are significant and robust literatures analyzing each of these policy instruments in
isolation, their mutual relationship and interaction has received somewhat
less attention. Such neglect is mildly surprising in light of a strong intuition that the three devices are structurally related to one another (either
as complements or substitutes). In this paper, we construct an agency
cost model of the …rm in which corporate governance protections, executive compensation levels, and litigation incentives are all endogenously
determined. We then test the predictions of the model using a …rm-level
data set including governance, executive compensation, and securities litigation variables. Consistent with our predictions, we …nd governance and
compensation to be structural substitutes with one another, so that more
protective governance structures tend to coincide with lower-powered incentives in executive contracts. Also consistent with our predictions, we
…nd executive compensation and shareholder litigation appear to be structural complements to one another, so that higher powered incentives tend
to catalyze more frequent litigation. In fact, we estimate that each 1%
increase in the incentive component of a CEO’s contract predicts 0.3% increase in the likelihood of a securities class action and a $3.4 million dollar
increase in expected settlement costs. In addition, the complementarity
of executive compensation and litigation allows us to formulate new ways
to test for the e¤ects of legal reform, such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The results of our preliminary tests appear
inconsistent with the claims of the statute’s proponents that the PSLRA
systematically discouraged non-meritorious litigation without burdening
meritorious claims, particularly for …rms with relatively low volatility.
First Draft: April 26, 2004. Thanks to Ehud Kamar, Mat McCubbins, John Romley,
Joel Watson, Shelly White, and seminar participants at UCSD and University of San Diego
for helpful comments. All errors are ours.
y USC Law School and RAND Corporation. Email: etalley@law.usc.edu.
z RAND Corporation. Email: gudrun@rand.org
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Introduction

Most modern theories of corporate behavior turn critically on the foundational
premise of managerial agency costs –the misaligned incentives that incubate in
the interstices where ownership diverges from control.1 No doubt a testament
to the power of the agency cost approach, individual scholars from a multiplicity of disciplines routinely invoke it to motivate their own varied institutional
inquiries. Corporate and securities law scholars, for example, consider how the
threat of legal liability (through such doctrines as securities fraud or …diciary
duties) might tend to ameliorate managerial incentive problems.2 Organizational scholars focus on how the corporate governance structure of …rms (such
as board composition, voting structure, and takeover defenses) may provide
forms of direct oversight and concomitant managerial discipline.3 Compensation scholars, in contrast, focus on how compensation schemes can motivate
corporate …duciaries to act “as if” they were in the shoes of shareholders.4
The underlying motivation behind this paper is the observation that each
of above analytical foci, while informative on its own terms, is almost certainly
incomplete when viewed in isolation. In other words, we begin with the premise
that the “portfolio” of intra…rm incentive devices (including governance, compensation and litigation) can be best understood only if all its major components
are viewed in conjunction with one another. This observation is based on both
intuition and empirical observation. Empirically, it is clear that we observe
each of the above incentive devices in everyday practice, suggesting that they
tend to work as part of a larger mechanism for providing managerial incentives.
Moreover, …rst principles would lead one to predict all three mechanisms to
work simultaneously, since each plays a pivotal role at a slightly di¤erent context, and each likely exhibits decreasing returns. Corporate governance systems
largely represent an ex ante command-and-control approach, constraining the
authority of managers and inculcating more direct shareholder oversight of managerial conduct early on. Litigation, in contrast, is more squarely a source of
ex post incentives, imposing liability on a manager when a judicial actor deems
the manager’s prior conduct to have proximately caused a veri…able loss in …rm
value. Executive compensation stakes out somewhat of a middle ground, providing managers with rewards when various benchmark signals of value (such as
earnings reports) are met, even though the …rm’s ultimate return may remain
concealed from view.
In theory, any of these devices, if operating perfectly, might be able to solve
managerial agency cost problems completely. In reality, however, each su¤ers
from drawbacks that ultimately limit its singular use. Direct oversight through
1 Jensen & Meckling (1976). Under the Jensen & Meckling de…nition, agency costs include
problems of hidden actions, hidden information, in‡uence costs, and the costs of implementing
institutional structures to deal with them.
2 Easterbrook & Fischel 1991.
3 Gompers, Metrick & Ishii (2003). See also Graham, Litan & Sukhtankar (2002), who
estimate of the GDP costs of accounting and governance scandals (framed by the Enron and
Worldcom bankruptcies) at around $40 billion.
4 Jensen & Murphy 1990; Agrawal & Samwick 1999.
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an invasive corporate governance structure, for example, may restrain managerial opportunism, but it does so by reducing organizational ‡exibility, introducing
bureaucracy, and re-introducing the very monitoring cost that shareholders presumably hope to avoid by hiring a professional manager.5 Litigation, as well,
is frequently undermined by the fact that courts are admittedly poor arbiters
in hindsight of managerial business decisions, thereby rendering them prone to
errors that can both catalyze strike suits and dampen the deterrence value of
litigation.6 Finally, a number of costs also attend incentive pay, not the least
of which is the fact that paying signi…cant rents to managers necessarily forces
non-managerial shareholders to reduce their own payo¤s. Furthermore, while
incentive pay can help motivate managers to work hard on behalf of increasing
share price, it also provides an independent motivation for managers to mislead
public investors about the …rm’s near-term prospects, so as to increase their remuneration and to preserve their prospective ability to extract private bene…ts
of control. Given these limitations, it seems likely that each of the above devices
is unlikely to serve as an independent panacea for corporate agency costs.7
Viewed against this context, it is perhaps mildly surprising that much of the
existing literature tends to focus on various manifestations of intra…rm incentives
in isolation, abstracting away from the general interactions that can complicate
analysis. While understandable for reasons of analytical tractability, such neglect can prove problematic for a number of reasons: First, it may render faulty
predictions by failing to account for feedback e¤ects that echo against other institutional sub-structures. For example, a reform to securities fraud law (such
as the signi…cant reforms that took place in early 1996) may directly alter litigation behavior among participants, but it may also a¤ect the manner in which
executives are compensated or the intensity of shareholder oversight of the company through changes in the corporate governance regime. These changes may
themselves have boomerang e¤ects within the litigation market that deserve
attention if one wishes to make predictions about the e¤ect of reform. Relatedly, non-systematic inquiries can yield empirical …ndings that will be di¢ cult
(and sometimes even impossible) to interpret without greater understanding of
the relevant interaction e¤ects at play. And …nally, myopic attention to a single
institutional structure is likely to yield myopic policy prescriptions about how
courts, regulators, …rms or society in general should respond. In light of these
problems, it is important for scholars to develop frameworks for thinking about
mechanisms of incentive provision in a systemic fashion.
Our paper contributes to this systemic approach to managerial incentives in
at least two respects, the …rst theoretical and the second empirical. First, we
develop and analyze a game-theoretic model in which the corporate governance
regime, incentive compensation for corporate …duciaries, and securities litigation are all determined endogenously, each contributing independently to the
panoply of incentives that shape managerial e¤ort and disclosure. Within this
5 Arlen

& Talley (2003).
Romano (1991).
7 Or, in more tech-headed vernacular, each device is likely to have decreasing returns,
thereby implying that they will be used in combination.
6 E.g.,
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framework, we show that compensation and corporate governance tend to be
structural substitutes of one another, so that (all else held constant) more invasive corporate governance tends to minimize the necessity of signi…cant incentive
contracts (and vice versa). Moreover, compensation and securities litigation
within our framework are predicted to be structural complements of one another,
so that larger incentive compensation levels increase the expected incidence of
litigation, as incentive compensation often provides a temptation to issue misleading corporate disclosures. At the same time, however, we demonstrate the
di¢ culties that one might face in attempting to quantify these mutual relationships in “reduced” form. In particular, variations in a number of unobserved
parameters can cause simultaneous responses in governance, compensation, and
litigation that may generate apparent correlations that cut against their predicted structural relationships.
We then employ our theoretical predictions to inform empirical tests using a
large data set that merges observations on governance, executive compensation
and private securities class actions among publicly traded …rms. The structural
relationships predicted in our theoretical model appear largely to be borne out,
as governance and incentive compensation operate as substitutes while incentive
compensation and securities litigation operate as complements. Although these
relationships appear manifest both in the absence and presence of statistical
instruments derived to control for endogeneity problems, in nearly all cases
the e¤ect is both economically and statistically strongest in the presence of
endogeneity controls (once again consistent with our predictions). Perhaps
of particular interest, we estimate that each 1% increase in the fraction of a
CEO’s contract devoted to medium- to long-term incentives (rather than shortterm compensation) predicts a 0.3% increase in expected litigation and a $3.4
million dollar increase in expected settlement costs. While these estimates are
still preliminary, they appear signi…cant both statistically and economically. In
addition, the complementarity of executive compensation and litigation allows
us to formulate new ways to test for the e¤ects of legal reform, such as the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The results of our (also preliminary)
tests appear to suggest that even if the PSLRA reduced frivolous litigation (as
its proponents claim), it likely deterred meritorious litigation as well, and in
such proportions as to swamp the deterring e¤ects on non-meritorious suits.
In addition to these concrete results, the general framework developed here
may also prove helpful in assessing the likely e¤ects of current and forthcoming
reforms in corporate and securities regulation. Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (or SOX) is notable precisely because it constitutes not only a reform to
traditional securities fraud laws8 , but it also has mandaded signi…cant changes
8 The

Act, for example, extends the length of many statutes of limitation and imposes
new certi…cation requirements on CEOs that are likely to have the e¤ect of facilitating hard
evidence for pleading securities fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003) (as added by § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
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in both corporate goverance structures9 and executive compensation.10 In order to understand the ultimate e¤ects of these reforms, then, it is imperitive that
one comperehends the structural relationship between the constituent parts of
SOX. Given that our analysis uncovers somewhat stronger structural relationships between governance, compensation and litigation than simple historical
correlational analysis would suggest, there may be greater reason than many
currently suggest to think that the SOX reforms are capable of having durable
e¤ects.
Because this paper aims to provide a systemic account of incentive mechanisms, the relevant literatures are perhaps too vast to give complete justice to
here. In some ways, our study is closely a¢ liated with a few recent approaches
to use executive compensation structures to predict corporate disclosure. Ke
(2003), for example, …nds that CEOs who hold more stock options and stocks are
more likely to report longer strings of consecutive earnings increase, especially
for …rms whose stock prices are historically sensitive to earnings reports. A
number of other studies contain similar …ndings.11 In perhaps the most closely
related paper to ours, Johnson, Ryan & Tian (2003) …nd that incentive-based
compensation and the exercise of lucrative options is signi…cantly more common
in …rms who are subject to SEC enforcement releases. This study complements
theirs in coming to similar …ndings with private securities class action, but also
di¤ers in other ways. Indeed, our study not only formulates theoretical model
to frame the interaction of executive compensation with other incentive mechanisms, but we also estimate one of the principal costs to misreporting (in the
form of securities litigation settlements). Another strand of papers attempts to
estimate the impact of the PSLRA on “meritorious”cases using litigation data
(e.g., Johnson et al. 2000; 2002; Choi 2004). The results from these studies
are not mutually consistent with one another, due perhaps to the di¢ culty in
forming clean predictions about how the Reform Act should have a¤ected observable litigation choices.12 (We detail this di¢ culty in the theoretical section
of this paper). Our analysis, in contrast, attempts to test for the e¤ects of legal
reform not by analyzing the observable changes in litigation activity directly,
but rather in considering how the Reform Act was e¤ectively “priced out” in
executive compensation contracts.13
9 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2003) (prohibiting auditors from providing non-auditing
services to clients); SOX § 301 (requiring each member of the audit committee of a listed
company to be independent); NYSE Listing Requirements; Final Corporate Governance Rules
(November 2003) (requiring majority board independence).
1 0 See, e.g., SOX § 402. (as codi…ed in 15 U.S.C. 78m (2003)), (prohibiting, subject to some
limitations, personal loans made to any director or executive o¢ cier).
1 1 E.g., Baker et al. (2002); Cheng and War…eld (2002); Myers and Skinner (2001).
1 2 See, e.g., Bernardo et al. (2000).
1 3 Helland (2004) analyzes the merits of securities class actions using reputations as a proxy
for legitimate suits. He …nds that, for the most part, securities fraud litigation appears
to have little e¤ect on future directorships of defendants. Only in the larger quartile of
settlements, or in cases where the SEC has also brought an action does there appear to be
much of a relationship. Our results, however, suggest that securities fraud litigation does have
some interplay with other mechanisms of corporate governance – consitent with private class
actions having some e¤ect.
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This remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our
theoretical model and derives the structural substitutability of compensation
with corporate governance structures, as well as the structural complementarity
of incentive compensation with securities litigation. We also demonstrate in this
section some of the challenges for detecting these inter-relationships empirically.
Section 3 turns to our empirical strategy for testing our framework, and estimates the magnitude of the substitutability and complementarity hypotheses
described above. Section 4 concludes.

2

A Model of Governance, Compensation and
Litigation

Because the relationship between governance, compensation and litigation is a
complex one, a sound empirical strategy for measuring their mutual relationship
virtually necessitates developing some sort of theory about their interrelationship. In this section of the paper, we do just that, considering more formally
how corporate governance, executive compensation and securities litigation interact with one another in a game-theoretic framework of optimal organizational
design. As noted in the introduction, it is often not clear on a priori grounds
whether these incentive devices are properly seen as mutual complements, substitutes, or neither. The model presented below, therefore, attempts to formalize these concepts, and propose when, as a matter of prediction, each account
will hold true.
In developing this theoretical framework, it is important that it capture certain features of the institutional environment. First, and most importantly,
all three instruments (governance, compensation and litigation) must at least
potentially have a role in shaping incentives. If one of them were systematically excluded from our analysis, we would be unlikely to uncover interesting
mutual interrelationships between them. Second, each of these factors should
enter in a theoretically distinct way. For example, implementing good corporate governance is perhaps best seen as a type of ex ante protection against
future misfeasance, allowing shareholders (at some cost) to dampen the incentives that corporate …duciaries might otherwise have to engage in self-serving
behavior. Executive compensation, tends to work at an interim stage, rewarding executives when various benchmarks of anticipated performance are met
(usually as re‡ected through stock price). Litigation, in contrast, operates
ex post, when relatively reliable indicators of the …rm’s performance belie the
earlier benchmarks. Finally, our model should allow for the endogeneity of institutional design, in particular the structure of the executive’s contract and
Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) analyze a model of corporate misreprorting. They argue
that both incentive compensation and …nancing decisions may give managers an incentive to
misreport. Their model treats the legal process as an exogenous environment, while ours
anctually models litigation endogenously. Moreover, their model does not consider the fact
that compensation packages themselves are set endogenously, and instead simply assumes
exogenous share holdings.
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the nature of the …rm’s governance structure. Companies are generally free to
design these packages in a way that best maximizes expected …rm value.14

2.1

Framework

Consider a business organization (or “…rm”) owned by a risk-neutral Principal,
denoted by B (and periodically referred to as “he”), representing a continuum
of disaggregated shareholders. The principal is assumed unable (or unmotivated) to run the …rm himself, and he therefore retains a risk-neutral agent,
denoted by A (and periodically referred to as “she”), to manage the …rm. We
assume A possesses a stock of …nancial/reputational wealth given by W; and
in addition can procure a reservation wage of ! by contracting with one of the
…rm’s competitors.
The manager makes an unobservable choice about how to run the …rm, which
we denote by the variable e 2 f0; 1g, and which corresponds to either “working
hard”(e = 1), or “shirking”(e = 0). The net di¤erence between the two is that
hard work is relatively more costly to the manager, but it also yields a higher
payo¤ to B. Explicitly, the manager always incurs a cost of c 1 to run the
company while working hard, but shirking allows her to procure an additional
bene…t that would otherwise be unavailable, reducing her net cost to c^ < c.
From the principal’s perspective, A’s management choice matters because
shirking increases the chances that B will obtain a low gross payo¤ (VL ) instead
of a high gross payo¤ (VH > VL ) : The probability of each payo¤ type conditional
decision is given by the following table. By assumption, p1 > p0 :
e=0
e=1

Pr fV = VL g
(1 p0 )
(1 p1 )

Pr fV = VH g
p0
p1

Throughout the analysis that follows, we shall impose the restriction that shirking is never optimal: that is, expected returns to high e¤ort, (p1 p0 ) (VH VH ) ;
are su¢ ciently large that the …rm always prefers to incentivize the manager to
work hard rather than allowing her to shirk.15
Thus far, our framework more or less resembles a conventional moral hazard
model. To it, we now add elements pertaining both to governance and to securities fraud litigation. Let us …rst attend to corporate governance. In our view,
a predominant bene…t of implementing a “good” corporate governance regime
is that it allows for more direct monitoring of the agent, putting shareholders in
a better position to assess directly the executive’s activities and react thereto,
thereby having the functional e¤ect of reducing the attainable bene…ts from
shirking. In this spirit, we suppose that the principal can choose the intensity
1 4 Of course, companies generally are not free to contract out of securities fraud jurisprudence.
The model developed below, therefore, treats the parameters of securities fraud
litigation as exogenous, and the company designs compensation and governance structures in
the shadow of such litigation.
1 5 While relaxing this assumption is certainly feasible, the optimal contract and governance
structure in that case is decidedly less interesting.
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of the …rm’s corporate governance structure, a choice we denote by the variable
. Increasing – i.e., enhancing corporate governance protections – has the
e¤ect of dampening the bene…ts that A derives from shirking. In particular, we
assume that under governance structure ; the bene…t from shirking is given
by the function ( ), where (0) > 0; (1) = 0; 0 ( ) < 0; and 00 ( ) > 0:
Consequently, the net cost associated with shirking reduces to c^ = c
( ):
Although the properties above are all that are necessary for our results, we will
put some structure on ( ) ; and assume that it has the following functional
form:
c
( )=
(1)
1+
While it dampens agency costs, installing a high level of corporate governance is
not costless. Direct monitoring of management carries with it both an opportunity cost (of shareholders’time) and a certain loss in organizational ‡exibility
in the company. To re‡ect these costs, then, we assume that the …rm faces a
constant marginal cost of a of installing corporate governance, so that the total
cost of governance system is given by a :
Now consider the e¤ects of securities fraud. In a world where shareholders
always learn the true state of the world (i.e., VH or VL ) early on, securities
fraud would never be a problem. Shareholders would simply wait for the state
of the world to materialize, and compensate managers appropriately. In the
real world, however, the “true” realization of Vi is hard for B to observe in
the short term, either because it is not yet known, because it is knowable but
prohibitively expensive to learn about, because it is highly diluted with other
information about the company, and so forth. In such a situation, securities
markets will often depend on managers’representations about the health of the
…rm (in the form of earnings forecasts, MD&As, press releases, and so forth).
And it is these representations, in turn, that can ignite future securities fraud
claims. In this spirit, we assume that during the relevant time period that
sets A’s compensation, the true state of the world is generally not publicly
known.16 However, after the manager has chosen her e¤ort level, she observes
a signal about the …rm’s prospective outcome, denoted by 2 fL; Hg. The
signal is assumed to be unbiased, but imprecise. In particular, suppose the
agent has expended e¤ort level e; with associated success probability of pe : With
probability q the agent observes the true state of the world; but with probability
(1 q) the agent observes an uninformative signal. The conditional distribution
of the agent’s signal, then, is given in the table below:

Conditional
Probability

Pr f = LjVi g
Pr f = HjVi g

True State
VL
VH
q + (1 q) (1 pe ) (1 q) (1 pe )
(1 q) pe
q + (1 q) pe

1 6 As detailed below, however, we shall also assume that the state of the world does become
known with some probability, thereby raising the possibility of securities fraud litigation.
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Note from the table that q 2 [0; 1] is tantamount to the precision of the agent’s
signal, so that we allow to range from being complete noise to completely
informative. Also note that the unconditional probabilities of receiving signals
L and H are (1 pe ) and pe ; respectively; thus, is an unbiased signal about
future outcomes.17
Critically, we assume that while is observable only to the manager, she
makes a public disclosure about its content. She may choose to misrepresent
the signal if, for example, her compensation package awards her with signi…cant
incentive compensation upon news of a good state of the world. On the other
hand, she may choose to reveal truthfully if dishonesty imposes a signi…cantly
greater litigation risk on her. We therefore assume that B does not directly
observe ; but rather observe ^ ; where ^ 2 fL; Hg denotes A’s representations
about the signal she has observed.18 Should A contract with the …rm, then,
her compensation consists of the pair fw; g ; where w represents a ‡at wage,
and is a bonus payment that A receives if ^ = H.19
Once the agent has disclosed ^ ; and received her compensation, there is a
small (exogenous) probability that the true state of the world will be revealed.
In those situations where a low outcome has been revealed (V = VL ) following
an optimistic disclosure by A (^ = H), a possibility for a securities fraud suit
exists. Mirroring the actual contours of securities fraud law, we assume that
not all shareholders have standing to sue; rather, it is only those shareholders
who purchased or sold shares during the period of the fraud who are able to …le
private securities fraud actions. In particular, we suppose that just after the
manager’s disclosure, a proportion of existing shareholders are forced to sell
their shares for liquidity reasons. Under current law, the new owners of those
sold shares have the right to bring private securities fraud litigation. The pershare damages such a suit for each suing plainti¤ is presumed to be given by a
parameter Ddx; so that the total damages at stake are equal to D: We assume
that this value is su¢ ciently “large”that it exceeds the manager’s resources for
1 7 Moreover, the unbiasedness of the signal implies that the reverse conditional probabilities
also match the conditional probabilities given in the table. And thus, the reverse conditionals
are:
Signal
L
H
Conditional
Pr fVL j g
q + (1 q) (1 pi )
(1 q) (1 pi )
Probability
Pr fVH j g
(1 q) pi
q + (1 q) pi
1 8 In many situations (e.g., disclosure items that are not required but are subject to securities fraud provisions – such as earnings projections), the agent my have a third choice of
not disclosing anything. Within our framework, however, such a decision is tantamount to
disclosing a low state of the world, and we therefore treat it as such.
For more on the necessity of “soft” determinations for executive compensation, see Murphy
& Oyer (2003).
1 9 The reader will note that
turns on A’s disclosure ^ rather than the actual state of the
world. Because the true state of the world is not generally known, incentive-based compensation decisions must necessarily be predicated on ^ . As will become apparent below, the
incentives faced by the manager may further be distorted in the event that shareholders …le
securities fraud suits in those instances where the realized state of the world con‡icts with the
manager’s disclosure.
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paying the award (W + w + ), so that damages in excess of the manager’s
resources must come (if at all) from the corporation.20
Should new shareholders decide to bring suit, the judicial process will determine liability. Although we do not model the litigation process as perfect
(indeed, far from it), we do suppose that the process has at least some ability
to distinguish between the two contexts in which a low state of the world might
come about after an optimistic disclosure by the manager. They are as follows:
1. Truthful (but unlucky) reporting: fV = VL ; = H; ^ = Hg . First, the
agent may truthfully report a high signal, but the signal proves inaccurate.
At the time the agent observes the signal (and reports it truthfully), the
probability of this course of events is (1 q) (1 pi ) : By de…nition, a
lawsuit under these circumstances would be non-meritorious. We assume
that such suits nonetheless prevail with probability 0 > 0:
2. Untruthful reporting: fV = VL ; = L; ^ = Hg : The second context occurs when A commits fraud, covering up an accurate signal of = L.
Contingent on learning the signal (and reporting it untruthfully), this situation occurs with probability (q + (1 q) (1 pi )) : We assume that
such suits win with probability 1
0:
The special case of 1 = 0 corresponds to a situation in which courts are
wholly incompetent, unable to discern between meritorious and frivolous suits.
Conversely the special case of 1 = 1 and 0 = 0 corresponds to a situation
in which courts are omniscient. We presume that an accurate description of
the judicial system lies somewhere in between these two extremes, such that
0 < 0 < 1 < 1 (though our framework allows for all possibilities). We assume
that each side bears costs of k should litigation occur, but that before trial
occurs, they converge on perfect information about one another and thus the
trial’s likely outcome. Assuming they bargain Nash, they will settle at precisely
the expected value for the suit.21
Collectively, the disclosure and litigation behavior of the parties constitute
a continuation game which we denote by ( L ; H ; ) : The relevant strategies
that comprise are as follows. Upon observing the = L, we suppose that the
Agent reports ^ = H with probability L and ^ = L with probability (1
L) :
Similarly, when A observes = H; he reports ^ = H with probability H and
^ = L with probability (1
H ) : Finally, when the shareholders observe a low
2 0 For example, one natural way to endogenize damages would be to presume per-share
damages of
D = (2q 1) (VH VL ) dx;

which corresponds to the di¤erence in price between a …rm in which the true signal is known
to be = H and one in which the true signal is known to be = L:
2 1 The alert reader will note that our assumption about settlement yields the same prediction
as would a model of litigation with no litigation costs (beyond …ling costs). We do not consider
more elaborate (and less e¢ cient) settlement processes in this model both for tractability and
because virtually no securities class actions actually reach litigated outcomes. As such, this
assumption seems warranted.
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true realization, as well as a previous report of ^ = H; they …le a lawsuit with
probability : We denote the set of equilibria to as B ( ).
We summarize the choice variables and parametric variables in a (relatively)
concise table, as follows:
Var.
w

H
L

e
p1
p0
0
1

VH
VL
W
!
c
q
^
D
Y

Var. Type
Choice
Choice
Choice
Choice
Choice
Choice
Choice
Parameter
Parameter
Parameter
Parameter
Parameter
Parameter
Parameter
Parameter
Parameter
Hybrid
Parameter
Choice
Parameter
Parameter
Parameter
Parameter

Description
Agent’s wage
Agent’s incentive compensation upon reporting ^ = H
Corporate governance protection installed within …rm
Prob. that agent receiving signal = H reports ^ = H
Prob. that agent receiving signal = L reports ^ = H
Prob. that B sues when ^ = H; and V = VL revealed
Agent’s e¤ort level
Prob. of a high outcome with high e¤ort
Prob. of a high outcome with low e¤ort
Prob. of a successful “false positive” plainti¤ win
Prob. of a successful “true positive” plainti¤ win
Gross …rm value in high state
Gross …rm value in low state
Agent’s initial …nancial/reputational capital or “wealth”
Agent’s outside opportunity wage
Agent’s cost of e¤ort
Signal received by Agent about future state of world
Precision of signal
Agent’s report about the value of
Fraction of shares traded after A discloses ^
Damages awarded upon successful suit
Plainti¤ cost of …ling a lawsuit
Probability that true Vi is revealed to public investors

In order to facilitate later analysis, it will prove helpful to de…ne the function RA ( ), which denotes the expected continuation payo¤ of the agent (in
equilibrium) once she has received signal :
RA (L)

=
=

RA (H)

L
L

=
=

[
[
H
H

Pr fVL j = Lg
(q + (1 q) (1
[
[

1

pi ))

Pr fVL j = Hg
(1 q) (1 pi )

( + W + w)]
1 ( + W + w)]

(2)

( + W + w)]
(
+ W + w)]
0

(3)

0

In addition, it will prove helpful to de…ne the function RSH (VL ) ; which denotes
the expected net payo¤s of the plainti¤ shareholders after the state of the world
is revealed to be low following an optimistic report by the agent.
RSH (VL ) =

[(

0

Pr f = HjVL ; ^ = Hg +
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1

Pr f = LjVL ; ^ = Hg)

D Y]
(4)

2.2

Organizational Design Problem

The organizational design task for the …rm is to choose both a wage package
fw; g and a governance level for the …rm in a way that maximizes …rm value,
keeping in mind the underlying strategic incentives that the relevant players
have (which are likely to be responsive to the organizational decisions the …rm
makes). Formally, the design problem is as follows22 :

max VL + p1 (VH
{z

fw; ; g |

VL )
}

Firm ’s Gross Value

(IR) :
(IC) :
(EQ) :

a
|{z}

Gov. Costs

s:t:

w
|{z}

Wage

(p1
|

H

+ (1 p1 )
{z

L)

Exp ected Incentive Pay

}

1 (W + w + )
1 (W + ! + )
W + w c + p1 RA (H) + (1 p1 ) RA (L)
W + w c + 1+c + p0 RA (H) + (1 p0 ) RA (L)
f L; H ; g 2 B ( )

( )

Although the …rm’s objective is relatively straightforward, the three constraints
deserve more mention. The individual rationality (IR) constraint states essentially that the agent must …nd it optimal to work at the …rm regardless of the
current state of the world. In particular, the agent must prefer working to quitting even in the worst case scenario where she has observed a pessimistic signal,
issued an optimistic report, and a suit has been …led. The incentive compatibility (IC) constraint states that the …rm’s organizational structure must be
such that the agent when working …nds it optimal to work hard rather than to
shirk. As noted above, we suppose throughout our analysis that the stakes for
the …rm are su¢ ciently high that it always …nds incentivizing the agent to be
optimal. Finally, the equilibrium (EQ) constraint requires that from the point
at which A makes disclosure ^ ; the actions of the parties must be part of a noncooperative equilibrium. As noted above, the downstream litigation behavior
of the parties is presumed to be outside of the realm of contracting (although
the incentives provided by the …rm’s organizational choices may indirectly a¤ect
how downstream litigation plays out).

2.3

Analysis of Constraints

We begin by analyzing the e¤ects of the three constraints noted above, and
what they imply for the …rm’s feasible set of organizational choices.
2 2 Note that this net payo¤ does not re‡ect the expected payo¤ to shareholders from securities fraud litigation. While it is possible to include such a component, doing so both adds
signi…cant complexity and may not be appropriate. Indeed, to the extent that securities fraud
litigation results in damages paid by the …rm (rather than the manager), damages are simply
a transfer payment from incumbent to new shareholders, and are therefore welfare neutral in
this context.
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2.3.1

Individual Rationality Constraint (IR)

Typical of most of these sorts of problems, the (IR) constraint will turn out to
be binding. Indeed, if it were not, an optimal solution to any agency problem
with transferrable utility would be simply to sell the …rm to the agent. Given
that the agent is assumed to be liquidity constrained, that cannot occur in this
context. Simpli…cation of the (IR) constraint yields the following condition
(which holds at equality when the (IR) constraint is binding):
w

(IR0 )

!

In other words, the wage component of the agent’s compensation package is set
equal to her opportunity wage in the outside labor market. We shall impose
this condition throughout what follows.
2.3.2

Incentive Compatibility Constraint (IC)

Now consider the incentive compatibility constraint. This constraint also turns
out to be binding so long as incentivizing the agent to work hard is in the principal’s interests. Simplifying the (IC) constraint yields the following condition
(which also holds at equality when binding):
(p1
2.3.3

p0 ) (RA (H)

RA (L))

c
1+

(IC 0 )

Equilibrium Constraint (EQ)

Finally, consider the equilibrium constraint. In particular, we wish to characterize the equilibrium behavior of the parties in the continuation game starting
with the agent’s receipt of the signal ; and assuming that the agent’s compensation package is such that he has previously participated and has not shirked.
The equilibrium pro…le of the continuation game23 can be summarized by a
strategy pro…le f L ; H ; g such that each respective strategy optimizes the
payo¤s (respectively) of the agent that has observed signal = H (hereinafter
referred to as the “high type” agent), the agent that has observed the signal
= L (hereinafter referred to as the “low type” agent); and the plainti¤s, who
have only observed the reported signal ^ and the state of the world V:24
A modest but realistic parametric restriction on Y both simpli…es our analysis and generates the most interesting and plausible family of equilibria. Explicitly, consider the following assumption about Y in what follows:
i
h
(1 p1 (1 q))+ 0 (1 q)(1 p1 )
Assumption 1 Y 2 [Y0 ; Y1 ] = D 0 ; D 1 (1
p1 (1 q))+(1 q)(1 p1 )

2 3 The discussion that follows generally employs the solution consept of bayesian perfect
equilibrium, implementing re…nements such as sequentiality, the intuitive criterion and divinity
when numerous equilibria exist.
2 4 Because the expected payo¤ for reporting ^ = H are larger for the agent who actually
observes = H; we can constrain our attention to situations where H
L:
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The intuitive content of Assumption 1 is relatively simple. It states that
plainti¤s in securities fraud cases are always at least potentially on the extensive margin in formulating their …ling strategy. In particular, …ling costs are
su¢ ciently low that a plainti¤ would always wish to pursue litigation if he knew
that the agent always made an optimistic report regardless of her true information (that is H = L = 1). This corresponds to the condition that Y
Y1 :
On the other hand, Assumption 1 states that …ling costs are su¢ ciently high
that the plainti¤ would not pursue litigation if she believed fraud to be wholly
absent from the system (that is L = 0). This corresponds to the condition
that Y
Y0 :Not only is this restriction plausible, but it also comports with our
observations about the real world. Indeed, if Y < Y0 ; every …rm who experienced bad news would be sued (in reality, only about 7% are). Conversely, if
Y > Y1 ; no …rm would ever be sued for securities fraud, which we also know not
to be true.
Given optimal …ling behavior of plainti¤s as speci…ed above, and subject
to Assumption 1, we are now in a position to solve for the agent’s optimal
disclosure strategy and fully characterize the equilibrium of the continuation
game. Explicitly, there is a unique Bayesian perfect equilibrium to the litigation
game which falls into one of two qualitative types, depending on the relative
value of : The equilibrium of the litigation game is given in the following
Proposition, whose proof can be found in the appendix:
Proposition 1: Under Assumption 1, the unique equilibrium of the litigation
game is given by:
8
< ( DY
0 )(1 p1 )(1 q)
; 1; 1 (1 p1 (1 q))(w+W + )
if
( 1 DY )(1 p1 (1 q))
f L; H ; g =
:
f1; 1; 1g
if >
(EQ0 )
1 (1 p1 (1 q))
where 1
(w + W ) :
1
1 (1 p1 (1 q))
Proposition 1 states that the equilibrium of the litigation game turns crucially on the value of the agent’s incentive compensation. When is relatively
modest (
1 ), the unique equilibrium involves mixed strategies for both the
low type agent and the litigating shareholders. Note that the probability of
…ling suit, ; increases in over this range, re‡ecting the fact that larger values
of make securities fraud more tempting, and thereby increasing the chances
of suit after a bad state of the world is revealed following an optimistic report.
Given the equilibrium stated in Proposition 1, it is relatively straight-forward
to compute the equilibrium payo¤s of the continuation game for each agent type.
They are as follows (again, as judged from the point at which the actor moves).

RA (L)
RA (H)

0

=
=

(

(q + (1
1
(1

0
1

q) (1

p1 ))

1

( + W + w)

(1 p1 )(1 q)
1 p1 (1 q)

q) (1

pi )

0
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( + W + w)

,
,

,
,

1

>
1

>

1

1

(5)

1
1;

Note from the agent’s payo¤ functions that the e¤ect of both the noisy
observance of the outcome and of noisy litigation is that they jointly dilute the
power of incentive compensation, so that the incremental payo¤ from a high
signal is less than : This means that incentivizing the agent to expend high
e¤ort will be more costly than in a world where the true realized state of the
world were always observable.25

2.4

Optimal Organizational Design

From the analysis above, it is now possible to restate ( ) to re‡ect the equilibrium strategy pro…les in the litigation continuation game.
max VL + p1 (VH

fw; ; g

s:t:
(IR0 ) :
(IC 0 ) :
(EQ0 ) :

VL )

a

w

(p1

H

+ (1

p1 )

L)

( )

w=!
(p1 p0 ) 1
f L; H ; g = f L;

0
1

H;

(1 p1 )(1 q)
1 p1 (1 q)

=

c
1+

g

Before presenting the actual terms of an optimal contract, simple analysis
of the constraints yields some interesting …ndings about the ability of compensation, governance, and litigation to complement or substitute for each other.
Note from the (IC 0 ) constraint that and always move in an inverse relation
to one another. This suggests that at least when one holds other parameters
constant, compensation and governance should be policy substitutes for one another: ceteris paribus, the more invasive a …rm’s corporate governance regime,
the lower the power of the …rm’s incentive structure. Second, as noted brie‡y
above, (EQ0 ) implies that as increases, so does the probability of suit ( )
increases as well. In other words, as an executive’s incentive compensation becomes more high-powered, so does the credibility of the litigation threat. This
suggests that litigation and compensation are structural complements with one
another –litigation is likely to play a larger disciplining role when incentive compensation is large. Combining (IC 0 ) and (EQ0 ) ; then, we immediately arrive at
the conclusion that corporate governance and litigation are policy substitutes:
the less invasive a …rm’s corporate governance regime, the greater the likelihood
that the …rm will face securities litigation as a form of ex post discipline. Note,
however, that this last relationship occurs indirectly – as a¤ects , which in
turn a¤ects the likelihood of suit.
Analysis of this problem allows us to specify the terms of the optimal contract
and corporate governance regime as a function of the fundamental parameters
2 5 We

note also in passing that:
(
(1 p1 )(1 q)
0
1
1 p1 (1 q)
1
RA (H) RA (L) =
( + w + W ) ( 1 (1

p1 (1

q))

0

(1

q) (1

p1 ))

,
,

1

>

Thus, increasing has the e¤ect of increasing incentives, but not by as much as it would if
all information were revealed to the public and / or courts were perfectly accurate.
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1

of the model. We state these terms in Proposition 2, whose proof can be found
in the Appendix.
p
Proposition 2: If Assumption 1 holds, and if !+W
is su¢ ciently large,
c
the optimal contract and governance structure for the …rm is unique and

is given by:
fw ;

;

g=

(

!;

s

a

1

;

2

r

1 2

a

1

)

where
1

2

c

=
(p1
0

p0 ) 1

= @p1 + (1

(1 p1 )(1 q)
1 p1 (1 q)

0
1

p1 )

Y
D

0

1

Y
D

(1
(1

1
p1 ) (1 q) A
p1 (1 q))

The conditions assumed to generate Proposition 2 are relatively mild and
related to one another. First, as before, Assumption 1 implies that …ling costs
are in a su¢ ciently “moderate”range that litigation is neither totally absent nor
ubiquitous. Second, the Proposition’s result is conditional on the executive’s
disposable wealth being relatively large compared to the marginal cost of e¤ort.
The rationale behind this condition is that if the executive is close to judgment
proof, the threat of litigation will have a relatively small deterrent e¤ect, thereby
necessitating enormous incentive contracts (which would once again ensure that
litigation is ubiquitous).
Perhaps the more interesting aspects of Proposition 2 are the qualitative
comparative statics that it generates, which will provide the basis for our empirical estimations in the next section. These comparative statics are in tabular
form through Corollary 2.1:
Corollary 2.1:

In equilibrium, and under the terms of the optimal contract,
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the following comparative statics hold:
[1]
X
p0
p1
0
1

c
a
!
W
D
Y
q

[2]

[3]

@
@X

@
@X

@ (w +
@X

(+)
( )
Amb:
Amb:
(+)
( )
(0)
(0)
(+)
(+)
( )
Amb:
(0)

(+)
( )
(+)
( )
(+)
(+)
(0)
(0)
( )
( )
(+)
(+)
(0)

(+)
( )
(+)
( )
(+)
(+)
( )
(0)
( )
( )
(+)
(+)
(0)

)

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

@w
@X

@
@X

@ PrfSuitjVL g
@X

@ PrfSuitg
@X

@ L
@X

(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(+)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)

(+)
( )
(+)
( )
(+)
(+)
( )
( )
( )
( )
(+)
Amb:
( )

(+)
Amb:
Amb:
( )
(+)
(+)
( )
( )
( )
( )
(+)
Amb:
( )

(+)
Amb:
Amb:
Amb:
(+)
(+)
( )
( )
( )
( )
(+)
Amb:
( )

(0)
( )
( )
( )
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
( )
( )
(+)
( )
(0)

Examination of the table from Corollary 2.1 reveals a number of interesting
predictions. First, recall from the analysis of the constraints above that (a) executive compensation and corporate governance are structural substitutes while
(b) executive compensation and litigation are structural complements, holding
other variables constant. However, a simple correlational analysis of the three
would not necessarily reveal this structural relationship. For example, if a signi…cant component of variation across …rms concerned di¤erences in the success
rates of their operational endeavors (p0 or p1 ); then strong corporate governance
and signi…cant incentive compensation would appear to have a positive (rather
than negative) correlation. Identifying whether the posited structural substitutability of the two requires accounting for the endogenous e¤ects of these
(often unobserved) variables.
Second, the model predicts that the underlying incidence of fraud ( L ) will
increase as the plainti¤’s …ling costs increase, or as the plainti¤’s claimable damages decrease. This makes sense, given that high …ling costs and low damages
make the plainti¤’s threat of litigation less credible. Somewhat more interestingly, the incidence of fraud tends to decrease as the agent’s signal becomes
more precise, due to the fact that disappointed shareholders are more likely to
attribute an unpleasant surprise to fraud rather than simple bad luck (see, e.g..,
Bernardo et al. (2000)).. Finally, the underlying incidence of fraud decreases
as the likelihood of liability from either a non-meritorious ( 0 ) or meritorious
( 1 ) suit increases. While the latter e¤ect seems intuitive, the former is a bit
surprising. The intuition behind it is that an increase in the chances for liability
from a non-meritorious suit still encourages purchasing shareholders to …le suit
whenever VL is revealed, since they do not know whether the defendant actually
misreported at the time that they …le. This greater litigiousness has a deterrent e¤ect on the low-signal agent type, who is more responsive to litigation
incentives.
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Finally, an intriguing aspect of the table above is that it reveals how changes
in legal doctrine might be measured not by looking at litigation activity alone
(which is itself often fraught with indeterminacy), but rather by focusing elsewhere, and considering e¤ects on complementary incentive structures. In particular, note from the table that changes in the liability parameters 1 and 0
have ambiguous e¤ects on the predicted unconditional likelihood of class actions (column [7]). Thus, it is di¢ cult to interpret whether any signi…cant legal
change has occurred strictly by examining post-reform propensities to litigate.
On the other hand, executive compensation appears to increase unambiguously
in 0 and decrease unambiguously in 1 : This makes relatively good sense, given
that an increase in 0 imposes a greater risk of liability even on a manager doing
an honest job, thereby necessitating larger executive compensation, while an increase in 1 allows shareholders to depend relatively more on ex post litigation
as a deterrence mechanism, thereby reducing incentive compensation.

3
3.1

Testing the Model
Data

In order to employ our model empirically, it was necessary to assemble a data set
that included …rm-level observations on corporate governance, executive compensation, and securities litigation. The data set we use for our analysis is a
…rm level cross sectional unbalanced panel. It includes 12,840 observations on
2188 di¤erent …rms during the period 1992-2002. 434 …rms have only one record
within the data set, but 265 …rms would form a full panel, i.e. 11 measurements
per …rm. The data constitutes an inclusive merger of several data sets: In particular, CompuStat’s ExecuComp data set, the Corporate Governance Provision
data set of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), and Securities Class Action Alert Service of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). In
addition, we added industry-level data organized by NAICS (North American
Industrial Classi…cation System) number using Compustat’s Price, Earnings
and Dividends database. To acquire traded stock volumes per month we use
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP’s) database on securities price,
return and volume.
3.1.1

Executive Compensation Data

Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp data set includes 159,141 observations on total
compensation, and all of its components, of the top …ve executives from current
or historical S&P 1500 …rms from 1992 to 2002. The data set includes variables
on total compensation, as well as short-term compensation such as salary, bonus
and other annual payments. It also includes variables on long term compensation, which we de…ne as incentive compensation, i.e. the sum of the current year
aggregate value of the stock options granted to the executive during the year
as valued by S&P’s Black-Scholes methodology, the current year dollar value of
restricted stocks granted during the year, the amount paid out to the executive
18

under the company’s long term incentive plan (usually three year plans), and
all other total pay. The ExecuComp data set is furthermore a data source for
market price volatility and variables on the size of the company such as number
of employees in a …rm.
A representative summary of observations on executive compensation (for
the year 2002) appear in the table below:
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
In order to classify …rms within the North American Classi…cation System we
merged CompuStat’s Price, Earnings and Dividends data set by 6-digit CUSIP
number, an identi…cation number for each …rm. No observations were lost during
this merge and the data set comprised 118,141 observations.
The ExecuComp data set has multiple observations on CEO compensation
each year, due to di¤erent exercise dates on di¤erent stock options granted
each year. We aggregated those observations together into one measure, per
CEO-year. About 41,000 observations were discarded for that purpose.
One of the more important variables for consideration in our problem will be
the proportion of the chief executive’s total compensation that consists of long. The …gure below presents a histogram
term incentive compensation
+w
of long-term compensation across all …rms in our data set. Note from the
…gure that while there are a number of companies that pay either no incentive
compensation or a small amount (around 9% of our sample), the distribution
is otherwise evenly spread throughout all possible values, including over 4 %
of …rms in which the CEO’s compensation consists of more than 90% incentive
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compensation.

Figure 1

3.1.2

Corporate Governance

To capture corporate governance levels, we utilize a data set collected by the
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which includes detailed listings
of corporate governance provision for individual …rms published in Corporate
Takeover Defenses. The data are derived from various public sources, such as
corporate bylaws and charters, proxy statements and annual reports of …rms
from the Standard & Poor’s 500 index as well as annual lists of the largest
corporations in the publication of Fortune, Forbes and Business Week. The
IRRC sample holds 10,121 observations including measurements at the …rm
level over the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002. When merging the
ExecuComp data set with the IRRC, about 3,665 observations in the IRRC
did not correspond to the ExecuComp data set, hence we were left with 39,255
observations.
Due to the gaps in the IRRC data set, we estimate the missing values in
the years 1992,1994,1996,1997,1999 and 2001 with a linear interpolation, for all
variables in the IRRC data set. Gompers et al. (2003) use this same data
set to formulate a governance “index” by summing these variables, which give
them a form of ranking from democratic on the low end to dictatorial on the
high end. In order to facilitate interpretations, we reverse their order, so that
lower index numbers are tantamount to those …rms that would be thought of
20

conventionally as having “weak” corporate governance, and …rms with higher
indices corresponding to “strong”governance …rms. This table provides the …ve
number summary of the corporate governance index distribution over time.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
3.1.3

Securities Litigation

The SCAA/SCAS database includes 3286 class actions, principally …led within
federal court by private plainti¤s (though some SEC or state court cases manage
to leak in and were dropped), against individual(s), a …rm or multiple …rms of
which …ling date occurs during the period January 1990 to March 2004. Class
action litigation against multiple …rms were broken up; hence each class action
is held against one …rm only in our data set, resulting in 3,783 cases against
3,083 di¤erent …rms. If a …rm was being sued multiple times in a single year,
those suits were collapsed together in one suit per year per …rm, where the sum
of all settlement funds resulting from multiple suits within a year was recorded
in a separate variable as well as the maximum settlement amount during the
year. 361 observations were discarded due to multiple suits in a single year.
When merging the ExecuComp-IRRC data set with SCAS, 322 cases survived the merge. A total of 103 of these suits eventually procured settlements
that exceeded $1 million. Table 3 reports the number of …rms who sued in each
year of our data set for which we also have full information on governance and
executive compensation. If same …rm has been sued multiple times per year
we only observe one suit per year per …rm. The numbers are derived from our
merged data set comprised of S&P’s ExecuComp, IRRC Corporate Governance
Provision, and ISS Securities Class Action Services data set.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
While a number of features of securities litigation are worth independent
consideration, a signi…cant reform that took place in 1996 is perhaps worthy of
particular mention. In December 1995, Congress overrode a presidential veto to
enact the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).26 The Act, which
became e¤ective in January 1996, altered discernibly the substantive and procedural hurdles for …ling a securities class action under federal law. Although
the PSLRA’s procedural reforms were multi-faceted, virtually all of them had
the intent and e¤ect of advantaging securities fraud defendants relative to the
status quo ante. For instance, the Act requires plainti¤s who seek money damages now to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind for the underlying o¤ense
(1934 Act § 21D(b)(2)). Moreover, most circuit courts have interpreted the Act
as elevating the scienter requirement itself, and many now mandate that the
plainti¤ speci…cally allege and prove an extreme form of recklessness, and even
2 6 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codi…ed in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
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a knowing state of mind in cases involving forward-looking statements within
the Act’s safe-harbor provision.27 Additionally, the PSLRA requires (among
other things) a mandatory stay on all pre-trial discovery pending the resolution
of any motions to dismiss.28 A principal articulated purpose of the PSLRA
was to reduce litigation rates by eliminating non-meritorious suits while leaving
meritorious suits una¤ected.29 We shall return to the question of whether the
Reform Act succeeded in its articulated goals below.

3.2

Testing the Model’s Predictions

One of the stronger predictions of the analytical model presented in Section
2 was that executive compensation and corporate governance are likely to be
structural substitutes of one another, so that stronger corporate governance
systems would predict weaker incentive schemes (and vice versa). At the same
time, the model also predicts that executive compensation and litigation are
likely to be structural complements, so that ceteris paribus, higher powered
incentive schemes are likely to induce more frequent litigation.
Table 4 presents a simple pair-wise correlation matrix comparing each of
these three measures. Note from the table that the predicted relationships
appear to hold. As the table demonstrates, corporate governance score is negatively correlated to long-term incentive compensation, but positively correlated
with later litigation.30
2 7 The Act imposes a “safe harbor” for any forward-looking projection that also conveys
meaningful cautionary language about the potential lack of accuracy of such projections.
This safe harbor applies regardless of whether the private action is brought the Securities Act
of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 1933 Act § 27A; 1934 Act § 21E. As to
cases not involving forward-looking statements, the exact quantum of scienter required has
become an item of disagreement among the Circuit Courts. The Second and Third Circuits
require that a plainti¤ plead recklessness, but deem the test to be satis…ed circumstantially if
the plainti¤ can allege with speci…city that the defendant had a clear motive and opportunity
to commit securities fraud. Donald Press, et al. v. Chemical Investment Services Corp.,
et al., 166 F.3d 529 (2nd. Cir. 1999); In Re: Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation, 180
F.3d 525 (3rd Cir. 1999). This test was considered to be the most restrictive in the country
before PSLRA, but now may be the weakest. The Sixth Circuit has adopted a more stringent
test, requiring direct proof su¢ cient to create “a strong inference of reckless behavior” and
disallowing circumstantial proof. In Re: Comshare, Incorporated Securities Litigation, 1999
WL 460917, Fed.Sec.L.Rep. 90,513. Finally, the Ninth Circuit has adopted the harshest test of
all, also disallowing circumstantial proof and requiring that the plainti¤ establish “deliberate
or conscious recklessness.”In Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, 1999 WL 595194,
Fed.Sec.L.Rep. P90,512, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6339 (9th Cir. 1999).
2 8 In addition to these reforms, the PSLRA also mandated proportional (rather than joint
and several) liability for all but knowing violations of law, and mandated that courts conduct
a “Rule 11” inquiry as a matter of course at the end of an action.
2 9 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 104-50, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1995) (”H. Rep.”); Statement
of Managers, “Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,” H.R. Rep. 104-369, 104th
Cong. 1st Sess. at 31). Of particular importance to member of Congress was the degree to
which securities litigation involved meritless claims. 141 Cong. Rec. H13699 (daily ed. Nov.
28, 1995) (”Statement of Managers”).
3 0 The table considers suit within two years of the reporting date, given that the statute
of limitations for most private rights of action in securities fraud run between one and three
years.
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INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
While these simple correlations are informative, they are somewhat misleading. Indeed, as Corollary 2.1 demonstrates, the predicted empirical relationship
among the three variables of interest need not always square with their structural relationship. Thus, a more systematic approach is appropriate. Table
5 focuses on the relationship between corporate governance and executive compensation, considering various types of linear estimation. The …rst panel of the
table estimates ordinary least squares and random e¤ects models with incentive
compensation as the dependant variable. The second panel treats corporate
governance as the dependent variable, with the …nal model attempting to control for the endogeneity of incentive pay by using industry dummies, …rm size
and an executive’s non-incentive salary as instruments for long-term incentive
share.31 Note that in all cases, incentive compensation and corporate governance have negative a relationship to one another, and always signi…cant at
least at the 10% level (or 5% level on a one tailed test). Moreover, it is notable
that the strongest negative relationship between incentive pay and corporate
governance emerges in the …nal model of the table, in which instruments are
used to control for the endogeneity of executive compensation. This result is
comfortably consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model, at least
insofar as the relationship between governance and compensation is concerned.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Turning to the predicted relationship between compensation and litigation,
consider Table 6, which focuses on the likelihood of suit in any given year of the
data set as a function of controls. To account for the fact that fraud (or alleged
fraud) often takes some time for plainti¤s to uncover, and that plainti¤s face
between one and three years after discovery to …le suit, we use one year lags
of incentive pay, volume, volatility, and size as regressors. We also introduce
an indicator variable (After PSLRA) that takes on the value of 1 if the suit
was …led after the promulgation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995. Panel A reports OLS regressions, for various event horizons.
Panel B reports a linear probability model in which size and salary variables
are used to instrument for incentive compensation. Panel C replicates Panel
A but with a logit regression structure, and reports coe¢ cients in odds ratios.
Note that the coe¢ cient on incentive compensation is positive and statistically
signi…cant in all speci…cations, and thus higher executive compensation predicts
higher litigation rates. Moreover, the economic signi…cance of this e¤ect, while
relatively mild in the OLS approach, grows tremendously in the IV speci…cation.
Indeed, in Panel B, the coe¢ cient on Incentive Pay is consistently between .23
and.35, suggesting that each 1% increase in incentive compensation ratios leads
3 1 Recall from Corrollary 2.1 that the executive’s wage level was structurally unrelated to
corporate governance but predictive of the executive’s long-term incentive compensation ratio
. Thus, the model suggests this to be the best instrument for contending with
+w
endogeneity problems.
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to approximately a 0.3% larger probability of suit. While this may appear small
on …rst blush, it can add up –indeed, comparing the lowest decile of executive
compensation packages to the highest, this translates to between an 18% and
28% larger likelihood of facing securities litigation.
Note also from the Table that the introduction of the PSLRA did not appear
to have a signi…cant independent e¤ect on the likelihood of litigation. Indeed,
the indicator variable for the post-PSLRA period rarely tests signi…cant and is of
generally small magnitudes. However, the cross product between this indicator
and lagged volatility suggests that the PSLRA has had an e¤ect of partially
dampening the e¤ects that volatility has on the incidence of litigation. (At the
same time, this dampening e¤ect appears to disappear when instruments are
used for incentive compensation). The generally ambiguous e¤ects of PSLRA as
measured by litigation rates should not be terribly surprising in light of the fact
that Corollary 2.1 [7] similarly predicts ambiguous e¤ects on the unconditional
probability of suit. Indeed, this ambiguity is precisely what makes measuring the
e¤ect of the reform by examinging litigation activity itself a hazardous process.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
The apparently strong structural complementarity between incentive compensation and securities litigation induced us to consider one other speci…cation,
in which we attempt to use incentive compensation not to predict the incidence
of suit, but rather to predict expected settlement value of securities fraud cases
(if any) brought against companies within our data set. The next table considers such a speci…cation, in which aggregate settlement value is the dependent
variable. Note that since most of the …rms within our data set are not sued,
and some that are sued win dismissals (or non-cash settlements), our dependent
variable is truncated at zero, corresponding with the point at which securities
litigation is either unsuccessful or never pursued. This form of truncation makes
a Tobit estimation appropriate, and two speci…cations are reported in Table 7.
In both speci…cations, we employ two-stage estimation using our instruments
to create predicted incentive pay, and then regress this prediction (and other
regressors) on the truncated settlements. Our (still preliminary) results are
surprisingly large. Overall, a 1% increase in the fraction of a CEO’s pay that
is comprised of incentive compensation leads to an increase in total settlement
value of approximately $3.4 million. The introduction of the PSLRA apparently
molli…ed this e¤ect, but came nowhere close to eliminating it.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
We are somewhat surprised at the economic signi…cance of this e¤ect, and
robustness checks (still in process) may reveal the extent to which it is driven
by anomalies within our data set (such as outliers). While some manipulations
appear to reduce these estimates, they generally remain economically and statistically signi…cant. The resilience of these estimates — at least thus far —
is suggestive of the conclusion that executive compensation often comes with a
cost – in this case the cost of increasing the probability of securities litigation
24

and the expected damages that emanate therefrom. Whether bearing this cost
is optimal or not, it should be one that corporate boards should be aware of in
structuring executive compensation.
3.2.1

An alternative test of the PSLRA

In addition to the direct insights that our model has spawned above, the realization that governance, compensation and litigation may be systematically
linked suggests that there may be novel ways to exploit these interrelationships
empirically. For example, it may be possible to use our framework to conduct
an indirect test of a legal change, whose direct e¤ects are di¢ cult to discern.
Returning to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, as noted in both
the introduction and demonstrated in the foregoing subsection, the selection of
suits for trial and …ling often complicate empirical approaches for estimating the
e¤ects of the reform. After the passage of the Act, it is likely that the relevant
players reacted in numerous ways, thereby con‡ating the theoretical predictions
that one is capable of making. Going back to Corollary 2.1, for example, note
that the unconditional probability of suit changes in ambiguous directions as
the primary legal variables ( 1 and 0 ) change, re‡ecting the feedback e¤ects
that such a shock has on fraud rates, …ling rates, and organizational structure.
Perhaps an alternative way, then, to understand the e¤ect of the reform is to
consider how it a¤ected other dimensions of corporate behavior. In particular,
note from Corollary 2.1 (column [3]) that the executive’s incentive compensation
ratio, +w ; is strictly increasing in “false positives” due to non-meritorious
suits ( 0 ), and strictly decreasing in “true positives” from truly meritorious
suits ( 1 ) : One of the putative goals of the Reform Act was to decrease frivolous litigation without a¤ecting meritorious suits. Such a reform, then, would
correspond to a decrease in 0 with no corresponding change in 1 : As such, the
reform would be predicted to introduce a negative shock to executive incentive
compensation ratios.
This is a testable implication, and in Table 8 we attempt to provide such a
test. The Table presents various random-e¤ects estimations in which incentive
compensation constitutes the dependent variable. Among the control variables
we include an indicator variable for the post-PSLRA period, and an interaction
term between that indicator variable and the …rm’s stock volatility. Note that
the coe¢ cient on the post-PSLRA variable is positive and signi…cant, contrary
to the predictions of our model if the representations about the reform act are
presumed to be true. One interpretation of this …nding is that the Act was
over-inclusive: while it may have had the e¤ect of discouraging frivolous litigation (reducing 0 ), it also had the e¤ect of discouraging meritorious litigation
(reducing 1 ). If the latter e¤ect is stronger than the former, then it would be
unsurprising to see the reported coe¢ cient.
Note as well from Table 8 that the e¤ects of the PSLRA appear to have
depended on whether the stock at issue was a low or high volatility stock. The
negative coe¢ cient on the interaction term suggests that the act may have come
closer to its intended e¤ects for stocks that have high volatility. It is in those
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situations that the stakes from a successful suit are likely to be the largest,
thereby enhancing the incentive to …le non-meritorious litigation. For lower
volatility stocks, on the other hand, private litigation stakes are smaller, making
litigation relatively more expensive for plainti¤s who do not have meritorious
cases.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
Although not included in the table, the results of the table are robust to
the inclusion of linear and quadratic time trends, which helps to control for the
e¤ects of unobserved variables that likely induced greater executive compensation levels in the 1990s. Even so, of course, it is di¢ cult to tease out causal
relationships from tables such as that above, and we are currently in the process
of shoring up this result with other approaches that may be more suggestive of
causality. Although not reported here in tabular form, we have estimated autoregressive speci…cations of the compensation equation to test whether passage
of the PSLRA fails to “Granger” cause incentive structure.32 Here we have
found similar e¤ects, rejecting the null hypothesis of no Granger causaility, and
similarly …nding that e¤ectiveness and lagged e¤ectiveness of the PSLRA predicts increases in incentive compensation.33 We are currently pursuing other
methods of teasing out causality, such as inclusion of control group …rms and
joint dependent variable estimation, and will report on those tests in subsequent
drafts.

4

Conclusion

In this paper we constructed an agency cost model of the …rm to study how
three central mechanisms of managerial incentives –corporate governance protections, executive compensation levels, and litigation endogenously interact
with one another. The framework predicts that incentive pay and governance
are likely to be structural substitutes with one another, while compensation and
shareholder litigation are likely to be structural complements. We veri…ed these
predictions empirically, and then explored particular dimensions of them. In
particular higher powered incentives appear to catalyze securities class action
litigation. According to our estimates, each 1% increase in the incentive component of a CEO’s contract predicts a 0.3% increase in a class action …ling and
a $3.4 million dollar increase in expected settlement costs. In addition, we
used our framework to formulate a test for the e¤ects of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Our results appear inconsistent with the claims
of the statute’s proponents that the PSLRA systematically discouraged frivilous
litigation without burdening meritorious claims. However, after introduction of
3 2 E.g.,

Sims (1972).
null hypothesis of no Granger causality is rejected at all conventional p values. Interestingly, the lagged e¤ects of PSLRA appear strongest two years out, suggesting that the
the e¤ects of the Reform Act were the strongest after the passage of the Uniform Standards
Act of 1998.
3 3 The
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the PSLRA, the responsiveness of settlement costs to incentive compensation
was dampened somewhat (by approximately 20%).
Although we have not explored the issue at length here, the framework developed in this paper may be of assistance to policy analysts attempting to predict
the e¤ects of new legal and regulatory reforms, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002. The SOX reforms have come under some degree of criticism for focusing on elements of corporate governance and executive compensation which
historically have not been closely correlated with securities fraud. Our approach, however, would advise caution in leaping to such a conclusion. Indeed,
an exogenous shock to all …rm’s governance structures or compensation schemes
would a¤ect incentives at the structural level (rather than reduced level). Consequently, the e¤ects of such a shock may be signi…cantly larger than historical
analyses predict. This extension of our framework, however, is worthy of a
paper all to itself, and we leave it to future work.
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6

Appendix

This appendix contains proofs of propositions above.

6.1

Proof of Propositon 1:

Proposition 1: Under Assumption 1, the unique equilibrium of the litigation
game is given by f L ; H ; g where:
8
< ( DY
0 )(1 p1 )(1 q)
; 1; 1 (1 p1 (1 q))(w+W + )
if
( 1 DY )(1 p1 (1 q))
f L; H ; g =
:
f1; 1; 1g
if >
where

1

1 (1

1

1 (1

p1 (1 q))
p1 (1 q))

1
1;

(w + W ) :

Proof: Application of Bayes rule and the posited equilibrium path to RB (VL )
generates the following lemma, which facilitates the proof of the Proposition:
Lemma 1: When a low state of the world is revealed following A’s report of
^ = H, the plainti¤ ’s optimal …ling strategy is given by:
8
(q+(1 q)(1 p1 ))+ 0 H (1 q)(1 p1 )
>
1
if Y < D 1 LL (q+(1
>
q)(1 p1 ))+ H (1 q)(1 p1 )
>
<
1 L (q+(1 q)(1 p1 ))+ 0 H (1 q)(1 p1 )
( L; H ) =
f 2 (0; 1)g if Y = D
L (q+(1 q)(1 p1 ))+ H (1 q)(1 p1 )
>
>
>
1 L (q+(1 q)(1 p1 ))+ 0 H (1 q)(1 p1 )
: 0
if Y > D
L (q+(1 q)(1 p1 ))+ H (1 q)(1 p1 )

Now consider …rst the contingency where ^ = H; but the actual state of the
world is later revealed to be VL . As noted above, this outcome is assumed to be
what generates securities litigation, and it can occur for two reasons: First, A
might have observed = L; and but committed fraud (i.e., ^ = H), which she
will do with probability L . Along the equilibrium path, the probability that
this contingency occurs is:
Pr fVL revealed;

= L; ^ = Hg = Pr f^ = Hj = L; VL revealedg
(6)
Pr f = LjVL revealedg
Pr fVL revealedg
= L (q + (1 q) (1 pi )) (1 p1 )

where i = 0; 1 denotes whether the agent has previously shirked. Alternatively
A might have observed = H and (truthfully) reported ^ = H with probability H ; but is unlucky and the state of the world is revealed to be VL : This
contingency occurs with equilibrium probability:
Pr fVL revealed;

= H; ^ = Hg =

Pr f^ = Hj = H; VL revealedg (7)
Pr f = HjVL revealedg
Pr fVL revealedg
= H ((1 q) (1 p1 )) (1 p1 )
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And thus:
Pr fVL revealed; ^ = Hg = Pr fVL revealed; = L; ^ = Hg + Pr fVL revealed; = H; ^ = Hg
(8)
= (1 p1 ) [ L (q + (1 q) (1 p1 )) + H (1 q) (1 p1 )]
Using Bayes rule, then, the probability that the state fVL ; ^ = Hg has been
reached because of fraud (rather than bad luck) is:
Pr f = LjVL revealed; ^ = Hg =
=

Pr fVL revealed; = L; ^ = Hg
Pr fVL revealed; ^ = Hg
q) (1 p1 ))
L (q + (1
(q
+
(1
q)
(1
p
))
+ H (1 q) (1
L
1

which results in liability with probability 1 :
The (complementary) probability that the state has been reached by bad
luck is
q) (1 p1 )
H (1
;
(10)
q) (1 p1 )) + H (1 q) (1 p1 )
L (q + (1
which results in liability with probability
bility of liability is given by
1

L
L

(q + (1
(q + (1

q) (1
q) (1

p1 )) +
p1 )) +

0:

Conseqently, the expected proba-

0
H

(1 q) (1 p1 )
(1 q) (1 p1 )
H

(11)

and the expression in Lemma 1a simply discounts damages D by this probability, comparing it to …ling cost. QED
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is relatively straightforward. It essentially
states that if, under the posited equilibrium, the expected value of the suit
exceeds …ling costs, shareholders will bring suit. If …ling costs fall short of
expected damages, then shareholders will never bring suit. Finally, if …ling
costs are exactly o¤set by expected damages, plainti¤s are indi¤erent between
…ling suit and doing nothing, and are therefore willing to play a mixed strategy.
Holding the strategies of other players constant, shareholders are more likely
to …le suit when …ling costs (Y ) becomes small, per capita damages (D) grow
large, the size of the class ( ) grows large, and the likelihood of litigation success against either a culpable or a honest agent ( 1 and 0 ; respectively) grows
large.
Under assumption 1, it can never be the case that a low plainti¤ type adopts
a pure strategy of truthful revelation –because then the equilibrium probability
of suit is zero, and it is pro…table for the low type to deviate. Thus the only
possibilities for equilibria are a partially mixed equilibrium and a pure strategy
equilibrium in which all agent types report high and litigation always occurs.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, we can proceed to derive the appropriate
conditions on L and that give rise to indi¤erence by those players. Letting
1 p1 (1 q)
q
Q = (1 q)(1
p1 ) + 1 = (1 p1 )(1 q) ; the indi¤erence condition for the plainti¤s
is:
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(9)

p1 )

Y
=
D

1

L
L

Q+
Q+1

0

(12)

And thus:
L

Y
D

=

1

0

(1

p1 ) (1

q)

(1

p1 (1

q))

(13)

Y
D

The indi¤erence condition for the low type agent is:
0

=
=

Pr fVL j = Lg
(1 p1 (1 q))

(14)

1
1

(w + W + )

And thus:
=
1

(1

p1 (1

q)) (w + W + )

(15)

However, this mixed equilibrium can exist only so long as L and as speci…ed above are in the interval (0; 1) : The condition on 1 ensures that this will
be the case.

6.2

Additional Continuation Equilibria

First, consider the remaining equilibria of the litigation game if one allows for
the possibility that Y 2
= [Y0 ; Y1 ] : It turns out that in addition to the three
equilibria noted above, four other qualitative equilibria emerge.
6.2.1

Equlibrium 3: f

L; H ;

This equilibrium occurs whenver

g = f0; 1; 0g
= 0: Su¢ cient conditions are therefore:
Y

0
= 0

In this region, by construction = 0: Consequently, the …rm is unable to deter
the agent from shirking, and the optimal contract is given by f!; 0; 0g : Because
we have presumed that the optimal organizational structure is to induce high
e¤ort, this equilibrium is never consistent with an optimal contract.
6.2.2

Equlibrium 4: f

L; H ;

g = f0; 0; 1g

In this equilibrium, both the high and low signal receivers report a low signal.
This occurs when the litigation threat is so grave that agents always want to
sue whenever a low state occurs after a high outcome is reported – even in
an equiilibrium where the agent always tells the truth. In other words, the
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agent is so scared of litigation that he misleades in a pessimistic way. Su¢ cient
conditions for this equilibrium to obtain are34 :
Y

< Y0 =
<

0

Equlibrium 5: f

6.2.3

=

0 D;

1

L; H ;

(1 q) 0
(1 q)

(W + w)
0

g = f0; 1; 1g

This equilibrium occurs when low signal types are completely deterred, while
high signal types tell the thruth. In this equilibrium all suits are non-meritorious.
Su¢ cient conditions for this equilibrium to obtain are:
Y

Y0 =
2

6.2.4

[

0;

0D
1]

=

1

Equlibrium 6: f

(1 q) 0
(1 q)
L; H ;

(W + w) ;
0

q
1

1

q

(W + w)
1

g = f1; 1; 0g

In this equilibrium, the high and low signal agent make optimistic reports, and
the plainti¤s never sue when a low state is revealed. In this equilibrium, the low
signal agent type always commits fraud. This equilibrium can occur whenever
…ling costs are so high that a suit against A is unpro…table even when it’s quite
likely (bayesian posterior of q > 12 ) that the agent committed fraud. Su¢ cient
conditions for this equilibrium to obtain are:
Y

> Y1 = D (
> 0

1q

+

0

(1

q)) ;

Summarizing, shareholders never …le suit even if they knew that A was committing fraud in h. Knowing this, it is easy to verify that A always commits
fraud.
6.2.5

Summary

The table below summarizes all of the plausible equilibria f L ; H ; g of the
game, depending on the parameters. The numbers in brackets denote the
equilibrium type as described above .35
3 4 Notice that in this equilibrium, no agent-type sends signal ^ = H; and we must also specify
o¤ equilibrium beliefs for this equilibriu. It turns out, however, that any set of o¤-equilibrium
conjectures justi…es this equilibrium.
3 5 THere are some equilibria which we exclude for various reasons. For example, there is
one in which f L ; H ; g = 0; H ;
: But for this equilibrium to exist, however, it must
be that Y = 0 D; which is not an interesting equilibrium because it requires exact equality
on the litigation costs condition, which is unlikley to be met. Similarly, when Y 2 [Y0 ; Y1 ] and
< 0 ; there is another sequential equilibrium in which f L ; H ; g = f0; 0; 1g : However,
supporting this equilibrium requires that the plainti¤ have o¤ equilibrium beliefs that fail a
divinity requirement. We therefore report only the one that survives such re…nement.
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Y < Y0
[1]
f0; 1; 0g

=0
2 (0;

0]

2[

0;

>

1

6.3

1]

Y 2 [Y0 ; Y1 ]
[1]
f0; 1; 0g
Y
(D
( 1

[4]

f0; 0; 1g

[5]

f0; 1; 1g

[2b]

f1; 1; 1g

0
Y
D

[3a]

) (1 q)
; 1;
) q

Y > Y1
[1]
f0; 1; 0g
[6a]

q

1 (W +w+

f1; 1; 0g

)
[3b]

Y
(D
0 ) (1 q)
; 1;
Y
( 1 D
) q
[2a]
f1; 1; 1g

[6b]

q

1 (W +w+

f1; 1; 0g

)

[6c]

f1; 1; 0g

Proposition 2

Proposition 2: If Assumption 1, and if (W c+!) is su¢ ciently large, the optimal contract and governance structure for the …rm are given by:

fw; ; g =

s

(

!;

a

1

;

2

r

1 2

1

a

)

where
1

2

c

=
(p1
0

(1 q)
q

p0 ) 1

= @p1 + (1

p1 )

0
1

Y
D

0

1

Y
D

(1
q

1

q) A

Proof: We subdivide the proof into two sections, each concerning subregions
of :
6.3.1

1:

Case 1:

We begin our inquiry on the most interesting/plausible family of equilibria in
which
1 : Recall that in this permutation, the constraints of the problem
are given by:
w

= !
0
= @

f

L; H ;

g =

8
<
:

c
(p1

p0 ) 1

Y
D

0

1

Y
D

(1 q)
q

(1

q)
q
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0
1

; 1;

(16)

1

1
1+

A
q

1

9
=

(W + w + ) ;

Substituting these terms into our objective function allows us to restate the
…rm’s problem as follows:
max

2[0;

1]

VL + p1 (VH

VL )

!

c

1

a

1

(17)

2

where:
c

=

1

(p1
0

p0 ) 1

= @p1 + (1

2

1

p1 )

(18)

(1 p1 )(1 q)
1 p1 (1 q)

0

Y
D

0

1

Y
D

1
p1 ) (1 q) A
p1 (1 q))

(1
(1

Maximizing yields:
w

= !
s
=
=

6.3.2

>

Case 2:

1

r

a

1
2
1 2

1

a

:

As above, …rst consider the varius constraints under this permutation
w

= !

(19)

=

f

L; H ;

(p1
1
1+
g = f1; 1; 1g

p0 ) (

1

(1

c
p1 (1 q))

0

(1

q) (1

(w + W )

which simpli…es the …rm’s objective function to:
VL + p1 (VH

VL )

!

c

a

3

1+

+

4;

(20)

where
3

=

4

=

(p1 p0 ) (
(w + W )

1

(1

c
p1 (1 q))
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0

(1

q) (1

(21)
p1 ))

p1 ))

First order conditions for maximization in
w

= !
r
a
=
3
r
3

=

a

imply:
(22)
4

1

Interestingly, note that in this region there is a one-to-one tradeo¤
between incentive compensation and wage. Indeed, given that the
agent always mis-reports and always claims the bonus in this region,
there is no longer a unique compensation package, and instead it is
a continuum of wage/incentive packages such that:
r
a
W
+w =
3

6.3.3

Uniqueness of Optimal Solution

Recall that by hypothesis
1 ; and that
ness, then, it su¢ ces to demonstrate that

s

3

1:

In order to show unique-

<
,

s

1

>

1

<

2

p4
a

This is always true if the left hand side of the above expression is non-positive,
which occurs when:

1 3

>

(23)

2

()

c
(p1 p0 ) 1
(p1 p0 ) (

1

0
1

(1
1

p1 )(1 q)
p1 (1 q)

c
(1 p1 (1 q))

0

> (p1 + (1

(1 q)(1 p1 ))

p1 )

L)

A su¢ cient condition for this expression to hold is if:
c
which clearly holds for all c
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Given that there is a unique solution, the question is whether it falls into
1 ] ; in which case the stated proposition must hold. We therefore ask under
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what conditions the following is satis…ed:
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of CEO Compensation in 2002
The table below shows the five number summaries for the components of CEO compensation for a sample year of 2002. Total of 1420 CEOs are recorded
in 2002. Our dataset has a total of 12,840 observations on 3312 different CEO’s in 2020 different firms during the whole period 1992-2002. All
calculations are based on the Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp dataset and reported in thousands of dollars. Total compensation consists of short term
and long-term compensation. Short-term compensation is defined as yearly salary, bonuses and other annual payment not identified as salary or
bonus. Long term compensation consists of the value of restricted stocks granted during the fiscal year, determined at the date of the grant and the
aggregate value of stock options granted issued during the fiscal year valued by S&P’s using Black-Scholes method.

Payment Category
First
Third
Standard
(thousands of dollars)
Mean Median Quantile Quantile Deviation
CEOs (N= 1420)
5,071
2,720
1,270
5,907
7,409
Total Compensation
Short term compensation
1,511
1,075
635
1,866
1,522
Salary
681
630
441
880
364
Bonus
760
381
46
976
1,222
Other annual
70
0
0
22
371
Long term compensation
3,557
1,361
358
3,999
6,760
Restricted stock granted
536
0
0
0
2,324
Stock options granted
2,681
952
103
2,965
5,559
Long term incentive plan payouts
176
0
0
0
819
All other
166
25
6
89
774
Long term share of total
51%
56%
30%
74%
29%

Table 2
Corporate Governance Index
This table provides the five number summary of the corporate governance index distribution over time.

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

Governance index
Minimum
Mean
Median
Maximum
Standard Deviation
Number of observations

8
14.4
14
22
2.81
888

8
14.5
14.125
22
2.75
1071

8
14.3
14
22
2.66
974

7
14.8
15
21
2.67
1164

7
14.5
14.5
21.5
2.55
1095

Number of firms
25th percentile κ ≤ 13
IQR 13< κ ≤16.667
75th percentile κ <16.667

351
238
672

403
276
790

366
280
777

356
269
855

352
260
867

Table 3
Securities Litigation
This table shows how many firms were sued per year during the period represented by our dataset. If same firm has been sued multiple times per
year we only observe one suit per year per firm. The numbers are derived from our merged dataset comprised of S&P’s ExecuComp, IRRC
Corporate Governance Provision, and ISS Securities Class Action Services dataset.
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Law suit
1
8
26
35
9
16
30
40
47
34
76
322

Settlement > $1 Mil.
1
7
10
16
3
11
16
13
14
7
5
103

Table 4
Pair wise correlation between Corporate Governance, Incentive Pay and Securities Litigation
This table shows the pair wise correlation between the Corporate Governance Index, Incentive Pay and Securities Litigation within the year or within the
following two years, over the period 1992-2002. Corporate Governance Index takes values between 7-22, from weaker governance structure to a stronger one.
Incentive pay is defined as the percentage that long term compensation counts for in the executive’s total compensation, while long term compensation is
defined as the sum of the dollar value of restricted stocks granted over the year, aggregate value of stock options granted during the year as valued using S&P’s
Black Scholes methodology, i.e. how much the option grant was worth at the time it was granted and the amount paid out to the executive under the firm’s long
term incentive plan. Firm sued in two years, is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if firm is being sued in current year or in the two years following.

Corporate governance
Significance level
Incentive Pay
Significance level
Firm sued w/in 2 years
Significance level

Corporate
governance
1
.
-0.064
0.0000
0.0263
0.0029

Share of Incentive
Pay in Total
Firm sued in
Compensation
two years

1
.
0.1165
0.0000

1
.

Table 5
Substitutability of Incentive Pay and Corporate Governance
This table shows the results of regression estimations of the relationship between incentive pay and corporate governance. Panel A treats incentive pay as a
dependent variable in (1) an OLS estimation and (2) a generalized linear model with random effects at the firm level, and covariates being our corporate
governance index, average monthly trading volume in units of 100, stock market price volatility used in calculating the Black Scholes values for options, and the
size of the firm represented by the number of employees in thousands. Panel B treats corporate governance index as dependent variable, with volume and
volatility as covariates. Model (4) uses manufacturing industry, salary and number of employees as instruments for incentive pay.
Panel A
Dependent variable
Incentive Pay

Corporate Governance Index

(1)
OLS

(2)
Random effects

-0.0092
(0.0009)**

-0.0124
(0.0015)**

Incentive Pay
Volume

Panel B
Dependent variable
Corporate Governance
Index
(3)
Instrumental
variables for
Incentive Pay
clustering at firm
level

(4)
Instrumental
variables for
Incentive Pay
random
effects at firm
level

-2.7248
†
(1.4312)

-7.6938
(0.8871)**

8.58E-08
(4.76e-09)**

5.43E-08
(5.08e-09)**

3.63E-07
(1.44e-07)*

2.18E-07
(5.82e-08)**

Volatility

0.2704
(0.0142)**

0.2966
(0.0176)**

3.606
(0.4823)**

2.1889
(0.3277)**

Constant

0.4909
(0.0139)**

0.5283
(0.0223)**

14.4822
(0.5176)**

17.6551
(0.3185)**

11336

11336

11145

11145

Observations
R-squared

0.07

Number of firms
Standard errors in parentheses

0.02
2037

†

signif. at 10%; * signif. at 5%; ** signif. at 1%

2020

Table 6
Determinants of probability of private securities class action litigation during the period 1992-2002
This table shows the regression estimation of the probability of a firm being sued in a certain year with respect to values of variables in the year before testing
direct effect of the PSLRA. Panel A shows OLS estimation using a linear probability model of being sued in a current year with respect to incentive pay, volume,
volatility and number of employees in a firm, the year before. The variable After PSLRA is a dummy variable indicating whether the suit year was after the
promulgation of the PSLRA in January 1996. Panel B shows same estimations using salary level and an indicator of firms in manufacturing sector as
instruments for incentive pay. Panel C shows estimation results on the same approach as in the first Panel using a logit specification. Model (1) is run on the
entire dataset, where as Model (2) is run on a dataset excluding the year 1996. Model (3), (4) and (5) exclude the years 1996-1997, 1996-1998 and 1996-1999
respectively, in order to account for the transition period that may distort estimation on the effect that PSLRA may have had on litigations against public firms.
Panel B
Linear Probability with instrumental variables for
incentive pay

Panel A
Linear Probability

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Including
Excluding Excluding Excluding Excluding
(1)
Excluding Excluding Excluding
1996
1996
1996-1997 1996-1998 1996-1999 Including 1996
1996
1996-1997 1996-1998
Lagged Incentive Pay
0.0255
0.0292
0.0348
0.0374
0.0348
0.2346
0.2661
0.2802
0.3125
(0.0066)** (0.0070)** (0.0076)** (0.0085)** (0.0096)**
(0.0392)** (0.0457)** (0.0506)** (0.0599)**
Lagged Volume
3.77E-08
3.77E-08
3.85E-08
3.73E-08
3.28E-08
2.34E-08
2.14E-08 2.14E-08 1.96E-08
( 4.05e-09)** (4.11e-09)** (4.18e-09)** (4.38e-09)** (4.66e-09)** (5.33e-09)** (5.71e-09)** (5.95e-0)** (6.44e-09)**
Lagged Volatility
0.1087
0.1083
0.1062
0.1078
0.1172
0.0558
0.0493
0.0462
0.0395
(0.0298)** (0.0305)** (0.0312)** (0.0323)** (0.0337)**
-0.0311
-0.0328
-0.034
-0.0361
After PSLRA
0.0109
0.0121
0.0145
-0.0134
-0.0202
-0.0247
-0.0296
0.0235 0.0317
(0.0105).
(0.011).
(0.0116).
(0.0125).
(0.0134)*
(0.0116).
(0.0129). (0.0143). (0.0172).
Lagged Volatility*After PSLRA -0.0667
-0.0682
-0.0748
-0.0928
-0.1104
-0.062
-0.0589
-0.0574
-0.0584
(0.0322).
(0.0339). (0.0352). (0.0377).
(0.0312)*
(0.0324)* (0.0336)* (0.0354)** (0.0371)**
Lagged Number of Employees
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
(0.0000)** (0.0000)*
0
(0.0000)* (0.0000)*
Constant
-0.0206
-0.0219
-0.0227
-0.0245
-0.0268
-0.077
-0.0862
-0.0904
-0.0998
(0.0100)*
(0.0103)* (0.0105)* (0.0109)* (0.0115)*
(0.0151)** (0.0168)** (0.0182)** (0.0207)**
Observations
Number of firms
Standard errors in parentheses

9485
1694

8513
7561
6595
1689
1689
1664
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

5486
1649

9650
1709

8663
1705

7692
1705

6709
1679

Panel C
Logit Regression - odds ratios

(5)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Excluding
Including Excluding Excluding Excluding Excluding
1996-1999
1996
1996
1996-1997 1996-1998 1996-1999
0.3505
3.4903
3.7512
4.3413
4.3157
4.0026
(0.0684)** (0.9331)** (1.0243)** (1.2398)** (1.2897)** (1.3001)**
1.69E-08
1
1
1
1
1
(6.75e-0)* (7.59e-08)** (7.30e-08)** (7.24e-08)** (7.33e-08)** (7.49e-08)**
0.0316
34.1671
31.5783
29.4932
31.3367
33.8594
-0.0374
(33.3540)** (30.1756)** (28.0581)** (30.0602)** (32.8357)**
2.3665
-0.037
1.2784
1.4431
1.6786
2.6853
(0.0195).
(0.5284)
(0.5934)
(0.699)
(1.0121)* (1.2009)*
-0.0587
0.1567
0.1335
0.0991
0.054
0.0424
(0.0397).
(0.1621)
(0.1363)* (0.1017)* (0.0566)** (0.0458)**
1.0029
1.0026
1.0021
1.0022
1.0023
(0.0008)** (0.0008)** (0.0008)* (0.0008)* (0.0009)*
-0.1108
(0.0229)**
5570
1666

9485
1694

8513
1689

7561
1689

6595
1664

5486
1649

Table 7
Incentive pay and class action settlements
This table shows our predictions of a two stage Tobit regression on settlement fund sensitivity,
of a successful class action cases, towards predicted values of incentive pay, average monthly
stock volume traded, stock price volatility as used to calculate BS-option values over 60 months
periods, the number of employees of the company in thousands, and indicator variable for the
period after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act took force. Other than this indicator
variable, all others controls use one year lags.
Two stage Tobit regression
Two stage Tobit regression
using fitted values for incentive
using fitted values for
pay
incentive pay
Predicted Incentive Pay (Lagged)

341,000,000

439,000,000

(1.52e+08)*

(1.62e+08)**

Pred. Inc. Pay X After PSLRA

-86,600,000
(3.10e+07)**

Volume (Lagged)
Volatility (Lagged)
Firm Value (Lagged) (Black-Scholes)
# of employees (in 000s) (Lagged)

16.74634

17.93138

(6.882141)*

(6.906278)**

9.65E+07

117,000,000

(3.95e+07)*

(4.18e+07)**

1.80E+02

210.3455

(422.2426).

408.1461

84,301.72

80,193.84

(80271.82).

(82228.31).

After PSRLA

-40484000
(31007000).

Constant

-536,000,000

-646,010,000

(9.43e+07)**

(9.2425e+07)**

Observations

9594

9594

Number of firms

1697

1697

Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 8
PSLRA and Incentive Pay
This table shows estimations on the effect PSLRA may have had on incentive pay. Dependent
variable, incentive pay, is estimated with respect to the covariates; average monthly volume traded
with firms’ shares, market price volatility as used in calculating the Black- Scholes values for
options, i.e. standard deviation volatility calculated over 60 months and size of the firm
represented by the number of employees in thousands, CEO’s annual salary and a dummy for
firms in the manufacturing industry, with random effects at the firm level to count for repeated
measure of the firm. (Other controls for salary level and industry dummies not reported).

Volume
Volatility
After PSLRA
Volatility*After PSLRA
Number of employees
Constant

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Random effects at firm Random effects at firm Random effects at firm Random effects at firm
level
level excluding 1996- level excluding 1996- level excluding 1996including 1996
1997
1998
1999
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
(0.0000)**
(0.0000)**
(0.0000)**
(0.0000)**
0.2677
0.26
0.2636
0.2665
(0.0367)**
(0.0372)**
(0.0384)**
(0.0393)**
0.1332
0.1569
0.1968
0.1992
(0.0125)**
(0.0130)**
(0.0144)**
(0.0156)**
-0.0486
-0.0809
-0.1378
-0.1376
(0.0369).
(0.0379)*
(0.0401)**
(0.0416)**
0.0004
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
(0.0001)**
(0.0001)**
(0.0001)**
(0.0001)**
0.2399
0.244
0.2398
0.2363
(0.0142)**
(0.0144)**
(0.0151)**
(0.0157)**
11145
10157
7953
6789
2020
2020
1953
1902

Observations
Number of gvkey
Standard errors in
parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

